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A few months ago, I posted an article titled, Too Much of a Good Thing: Explaining the Decline of Guitar Hero and Rock Band which stimulated discussion on various blogs that linked to the article. Some of the issues raised related to complexity, usability, product life cycle issues, etc. But a comment on Plastic Axe was about something completely different:

Right now you can walk into any given Best Buy and there are probably at least three aisles worth of peripheral packages. This week they’re adding DJ Hero and next week will see the Band Hero set. This has to be overwhelming for the common consumer. Now most of those aren’t adding ‘new’ peripherals to the mix, but I’d imagine what is essentially the same thing in 10 different styles can be just as confusing and detrimental. At some point the regular shopper is going to think “Enough already!”.

When product choice becomes overwhelming to customers, they become subject to the “paradox of choice.” In the book, we discuss the phenomenon as it relates to game consoles, but it applies equally to peripherals, software, and other products.

Research has shown that even when faced with two choices, customers are often less willing to buy a product than if they only have one product available to them. Common wisdom holds that consumers are better off when they have more product choices to cater to their individual tastes and needs.

In reality, offering more choices could cause you to lose customers, resulting in declining sales for each product offered, and possibly for the product category as a whole.

When Scarcity Drives Demand

The flip-side to the paradox of choice is “scarcity marketing.” Marketers are familiar with the concept of creating scarcity as a way of driving sales. In the late 1990s, I had a discussion with a marketing agency that was responsible for the launch of a major game console.

To create buzz, they advertised to a select audience that the console would be for sale one day earlier than the rest of the world, but only in one store in a small rural town. That morning, the agency sent a film crew to the store to document the long line that had formed to get the console a day early.

In 2007 and 2008, an ongoing shortage of Wii consoles caused people to line up for hours. Others paid as much as $600 on the gray market (more than double the suggested retail price). Some accused Nintendo of deliberately causing the scarcity to create demand.

Very early the next morning, they broadcast the film via satellite to major news studios that then rebroadcast the footage on morning news programs. That sent customers scrambling to the nearest store before the consoles sold out. People did not realize that the footage was from the day before and the news studios were too understaffed to verify the accuracy of the footage (that it was not taken the same day).

Personally, I felt the agency had acted unethically and I was shocked by how willing they were to boast of their “success.” Regardless, the agency understood that a perception of scarcity can create demand, just as too much choice can suppress it.

This is a revised version of a post that originally appeared on Gamasutra on November 3, 2009

The 2009 Holiday Issue of PC Gamer magazine features an article by indie developer and Tripwire President John Gibson entitled “From Rags to Retail.” Gibson recounts the many trials associated with starting a new game development studio.  “We had sacrificed every second of spare time for almost two years” to create Red Orchestra, recalled Gibson.

Some of us even left our jobs to work on the mod full-time with hopes of winning the [Epic/Nvidia Make Something Unreal] contest. For the final four months before submitting the mod, I’d…code for 18 hours [a day]. My wife brought me food at the computer so I wouldn’t have to stop programming.

File:Red Orchestra box art.jpg
After winning the contest, Gibson thought he had it made. Distributors would come knocking at the door to offer lucrative contracts. It was Gibson’s “biggest mistake.” Nobody wanted to distribute Red Orchestra.

After numerous rejections, Gibson and his team were about to give up. Then they decided to try online distribution through the then newly launched Steam download service. “What did we have to lose?” he asked. The decision was fortuitous, as Red Orchestra was one of the first exclusive third party titles to appear on the popular online gaming service. “Our three-year-long dream was finally released.”

Gibson cites a number a factors in the success of Red Orchestra, such as timing, talent, and “a little luck.”

In fact, successfully distributing independent media products requires a lot more than luck. I recently published a case study about an independent film studio called Yves Productions.

The case synopsis reads:

After years of hard work and an investment of nearly $1 million, Yves could not find anyone to distribute his film. At the time of the case, it was difficult to get distribution because there were more films on the market than ever before. Historically, it took more effort to make an independent film, and distribution was easier to secure. When the digital revolution began, the market was flooded with more independent films than distributors could handle. By 2001, independent films were a commodity and DVD distribution deals were plentiful, but theatrical distribution was almost impossible to get because there were more independent films than screens to put them on.

Alex Yves encountered many of the same roadblocks as Gibson. Like Gibson, he thought he had it made with strong Hollywood connections, a well-known international cast, an experienced director, and a considerable investment to make the film as professional as possible. Yet, distributors would not release the film unless he relinquished nearly all the rights (and potential profits). The film remains unreleased to this day.

During case research interviews, Yves admitted that one of his biggest mistakes was not securing distributor support prior to sinking considerable sums of time and money into his film studio.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/c/c1/LittleBigPlanetOfficialUKBoxArt.png/250px-LittleBigPlanetOfficialUKBoxArt.pngThe case has several parallels in the video game industry. The problem in both film and video games is that the sheer quantity of product on the market increases the risks for distributors that need to incur marketing and promotion expenses. In much the same way as the advent of new technologies like cheap HD camcorders allowed anyone to become a film producer, new easy-to-use development tools are transforming the video game industry.

One of the lessons Yves discovered was that no matter how good your product is, it is important to secure contracts early in the process. Media Molecule, for example, secured funding from Sony long before Little Big Planet was even in the early alpha development stage.  Media Molecule founder Mark Healey went to Sony, even though he was sure they were going to think “we were a bunch of mad men,” given how unusual the Little Big Planet concept was, and the fact that 2-D platformers had fallen out of favor.

The Sony partnership proved critical to Little Big Planet’s success. Not only did it provide the funding needed to ensure a quality product, it opened promotional opportunities that would be unavailable to indie developers who are without deep pocketed sponsors.

What lessons do these cases demonstrate?

  • Develop a comprehensive marketing and distribution plan before you become too involved in your project.
  • If possible, try to secure funding and distribution contracts before you get too far into development. Even if the terms seem like most of the benefits accrue to the distributor, in a saturated market, going alone will prove exceedingly difficult.
  • Don’t assume that because you have a great product that distributors will come knocking on your door. Yves Productions had film stars and an established director. Gibson won the Epic/Nvidia contest. Yet, both had a hard time finding someone to promote their products.
  • Don’t assume that you need a working beta to pitch your idea. Media Molecule only had a concept when they went to Sony for funding.
  • Be willing to take risks and try new things. Red Orchestra’s success is directly traceable to the fact that it was one of the first third party exclusives available on Steam.

Of course, even if you follow all of these lessons, success is far from guaranteed. As Gibson points out, the path to success is long and hard. However, large distributors, such as Sony, Microsoft, and Steam are realizing that most of the important innovations in the video game industry are coming from independent developers. Large game studios simply can’t afford to take the types of risks needed to bring products like Little Big Planet to market. That niche will always belong to indie studios.

This article was originally posted on Gamasutra on November 18, 2009. It includes additional commentary and replies by John Gibson and other developers.

In 2007, after Nintendo suddenly and unexpectedly reestablished its leadership position in the home console market, Sony and Microsoft were left wondering what to do. Clayton Christensen, who became famous for his thesis on disruptive innovation in the hard drive sector, offered several possible responses.

  1. Copy Nintendo by developing a motion controller.
  2. Repurpose a legacy product to compete with the Wii.
  3. Disrupt the disruptor

The Wii Remote, which cost less than $10 to make, was a game changer for Nintendo.

Although the article was directed at Sony, it could be applied equally well to Microsoft.

In making his first suggestion, Christensen appears to be unaware that Sony launched its PS3 system with a motion sensing controller – the Sixaxis. However, he rightly anticipated the challenges of a “me-too” approach.

While this would be the quickest path to market, it has some real risks. Nintendo’s system has been optimized around its controller. Simply sticking a motion-based controller onto an existing system could result in a highly disappointing product. The controller would remain an afterthought, as opposed to an integral part of the product.

In fact, that was how many gamers viewed Sixaxis – as an afterthought. What made matters worse was the lack of rumble, a deficit that was later remedied with the introduction of the Dual Shock 3.

Christensen recommends the third option as the preferred response to Nintendo.

Instead of following a me-too strategy, Sony could seek to truly develop a category-changing project. While this approach would take more time and require greater investment, it has the most long-term potential—if Sony can figure out a different measure of performance on which to compete in the video game market.

The question is how to identify category changing projects that offer different measures of performance. Christensen does not answer this question, nor does he explain why innovations introduced by Sony and Microsoft, such as Blu-ray and Xbox Live, do not qualify as category changing.

Sony saw its “different measure of performance” in the combination of the Cell processor and Blu-ray drive, two technologies that Sony believed set it apart from competitors. The problem was that few developers were able exploit the unique characteristics of the Cell and few customers cared about Blu-ray (at least initially). Still, any Sony executives who may have read Christensen’s advice must have been left wondering why he did not see the PS3’s unique features as category changing.

Microsoft’s own category changing features were centered around Xbox Live – by far the leading online gaming community in the world. Today, Xbox Live has become the de facto standard for online gaming and it is Microsoft, not Nintendo, that continues to lead the industry in this increasingly important niche. Meanwhile, Nintendo’s online service has become its Achilles heel, as it struggles to keep up with the competition.

Project Natal could be another category changing innovation when it is introduced later this year. Although Natal can be used as a motion sensing gaming interface like the Wii Remote, it offers much more in terms of artificial intelligence,  interface design, and potential non-gaming uses. For example, Natal-type technologies will one day provide hands-free control of products ranging from automobiles to security systems. In the long run, that will prove far more disruptive than the Wii Remote.

In the futuristic film Minority Report, Natal-type interfaces are used for everything from interactive billboards (above) to security systems.

In a recent Gamasutra post titled, Creating industry ecosystems: How indie developers contribute to large firm success, I explained why large companies need to work with talented independent developers to infuse the video game industry with new ideas.

In recent years there has been a transformation in the way people think about games. As development costs skyrocket and video game companies compete for the same customers, more studios are finding success in markets that traditionally have not been well served by the industry.

Games like flOw are helping to bring fresh ideas to the industry.

The problem becomes one of how to reach new customers with new ideas without betting the farm on concepts that may not work. For some companies, the answer has been to enter into partnerships with independent studios.

Independent studios, like independent filmmakers, are typically more innovative than large studios. What they lack is the funds to bring grand ideas to fruition. Large publishers and studios need to enter into partnerships with independent studios as a way to build relationships with some of the brightest minds in the industry.

This use of open innovation recognizes that large companies can no longer conceive, design, develop and market new products and services all on their own. No firm has all the knowledge capabilities, money or time needed in today´s costly environment. Firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, to advance their technology.

In Innovation and Marketing in the Video Game Industry: Avoiding the Performance Trap, we discuss how companies like Sony are partnering with independent studios to create games the push the limits of technology and innovation.

Last week, Gamasutra posted an interview with two game developers who have benefited from this new model, Kellee Santiago and Robin Hunicke of TGC. Santiago noted that “there are some movements in publishers – but especially in independent or VC-funded studios – towards a more project-oriented funding structure like you see in film.”

Instead of the software company model where you would buy a piece of the company and maybe rights to the IP, there is some motion away from that, and at the start it will depend on whether those initial projects are successful or not.  So I’m really hoping that those investments go well and we do move towards that model, as it does permit a lot more creative freedom in a company.

In fact, it is the lack of “creative freedom” that programmers at large studios often complain about. Tim Ryan wrote about his frustration as a game developer in Lead Designers Who Only Say ‘No’.

I’ve literally had a boss say to me. ‘Sorry, you can’t do that. It’s not what Halo would do.’ In fact, ‘What would Halo do?’ was his motto. In this case, he’s not defying tradition as in the previous example, he’s just not thinking beyond his competition.

In a comment at the end of the article, Ryan adds,

There’s safety in doing what’s been done. There’s less risk for a designer who says “No” to the new and “Yes” to the tried and true. I think the same is true all the way up to green-light committees. They pay lip-service to developing original IP, but in the end just chase whatever hits currently dominate the charts.

That makes sense given the amount of investment at risk. Large publishers cannot afford to risk big budget titles on unproven concepts. Instead, partnerships are helping to fill the void and ensuring that great ideas continue to reshape the industry. In TGC’s case, Sony wanted to “experiment” with new models, like digital distribution. “TGC games have that sort of fresh and intimate feeling,” explained Robin Hunicke, who joined TGC later in the project.

They’re really handcrafted – you can’t help but love them when you play them. That’s something that I think any developer notices immediately. It was clear to me that they are extremely concerned about the player experience – and that’s not something that’s just lip-service; it’s something that they think about every day.

"There's safety in doing what's been done." Big budget titles like Final Fantasy XIII cannot afford to experiment with unproven concepts.

Although large companies may not have the luxury to think about “fresh” experiences when tens of millions of dollars are at stake, they can continue to drive innovation through partnerships with small studios that are less afraid to experiment with new ideas.

The Wii: Nintendo’s Video Game Revolution by David Wesley and Gloria Barczak was recently recognized as one of the top business cases in 2009 by Ivey Publishing. The case is written from the viewpoint of George Harrison, Senior Vice President of Marketing for Nintendo of America, who is faced with severe product shortages after Wii sales unexpectedly surge worldwide. In preparing his company’s marketing strategy for the 2007 holiday season, he must develop a product positioning strategy that takes into consideration continuing shortages.

In 2007 and 2008, line ups like this one were common as Nintendo tried to manage ongoing product shortages

The case discusses Nintendo’s competitive position prior to the launch of the Wii, the success of the 2004 DS handheld console launch, and the factors that contributed to the ultimate success of the Wii, such as brand loyalty, content availability, third-party support and adherence to industry standards. The case also considers how radical innovations can be used to win market share from technically superior products focused on incremental innovations.

The Wii: Nintendo’s Video Game Revolution was a winning entry at the 2008 John Molson MBA Case Writing Competition in Montreal, Canada, and is featured in Understanding Business Strategy: Concepts and Cases by R. Duane Ireland, Robert E. Hoskisson, and Michael A. Hitt. In addition, a  Japanese version, translated under the supervision of Prof. Takuro Yoda of Keio Business School, is available from Ivey Publishing and its worldwide partners.

About Ivey Publishing

Ivey Publishing is the world’s second largest publisher of business case studies and the largest producer of Asian cases in the world, with over 6,000 products in its collection. Academic instructors can obtain free unlimited access to the complete case collection by registering with Ivey Publishing  at:

Web Site:
www.iveycases.com

Email:
cases@ivey.uwo.ca

Fax:
(519) 661-3882

Telephone:
Canada and United States:
1-800-649-6355
Outside North America:
(519) 661-3208

Mail:
Ivey Publishing
Richard Ivey School of Business
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada
N6A 3K7

When Sony launched the PlayStation 3 in 2006, the company touted its IBM Cell processor as one of the key features that distinguished the PS3 from other consoles. This “supercomputer on a chip,” would allow developers “for the first time can create games closer to actual intelligence instead of artificial intelligence,” Sony claimed. Although game developers are only now beginning to take advantage of the PS3’s processing ability, the United States Air Force has taken the claim literally.

When complete, the PlayStation 3 supercomputer project will cost $2 million.

Today, Stars and Stripes newspaper announced a $2 million government project to create a research supercomputer using 2,000 PS3s. The project will be headed by the Air Force Research Laboratory in Rome, New York.

According to Stars and Stripes,

Key to the whole idea is the console’s cell processor, which was designed to easily work in concert with other cell processors to combine processing power and has been critically acclaimed for its number crunching ability.

This lets the researchers leverage power toward running such applications as Back Projection Synthetic Aperture Radar Imager formation, high definition video image processing, and Neuromorphic Computing, which mimics human nervous systems.

Richard Linderman, a senior research scientist at the Air Force laboratory, explained that “this will be far and away the largest interactive high-performance computer.” Linderman also noted that the project uses Linux, an operating system that Sony has supported on the PS3 since day one.

Low cost supercomputer projects that use off-the-shelf components are not new. In 2003, I worked closely with Compaq Computer Corporation to create a case study series titled, “Compaq High Performance Computing.” By using standard components, Compaq’s supercomputer line, known as the Alpha Server SC, attempted to avoid some of the risk associated with supercomputer development.

One of the advantages the Alpha Server SC team was its ownership of the DEC Alpha microprocessor. Alpha, which was manufactured by Mitsubishi of Japan, was first developed in 1993. At the time, it was world’s best performing microprocessor for scientific applications, and became the core of DEC’s next generation servers.

A decade later, Alpha still outperformed most microprocessors on the market, including Intel’s Itanium. Launched in 2001, after seven years of development and $2 billion in R&D expenditures, Intel’s Itanium was a 64-bit processor capable of running at 800 MHz. It was also described as a “massively complex and [expensive] CPU which didn’t give the expected stellar performance.”

The architectural innovation that Compaq brought was scalable machines made by connecting commodity components.  This approach reduced the development risk and moved Compaq away from the “one mistake and you die” model that characterized prior generations of supercomputers.  The Air Force project is another example of how scalable designs are substituting for proprietary designs in the market, although purpose-designed supercomputers are still needed for specific applications.

In 1994, Atari television commercials emphasized performance and graphics

For non-gamers, learning to master most game controllers is, without question, a daunting task. In his new book, Ludoliteracy: Defining, Understanding, and Supporting Games Education, José Zagal observes that even experienced gamers can find it difficult to keep up with rapidly changing technology. He quotes one former gamer who says,

I no longer play video games because I don’t understand the controls. Give me a NES controller any day, but these new ones with all those buttons? I don’t know what to do with so many buttons!

Yet, complex controllers are not a new phenomenon. The Atari Jaguar was introduced in 1993 with a 15 button controller that represents the epitome of needless complexity, clumsy ergonomics, and deficient usability. Although technically, Jaguar was one of the most advanced consoles of its time, it should come as no surprise that it was also one of the worst selling consoles in history.

Atari's poorly designed controller helped solidify the company's demise

The following television commercial, ironically titled “Video Game Marketing 101,” emphasized the advantage of Jaguar’s 64 bit processor over the 16 bit and 32 bit processors that were common in competing consoles.

Although the clip touted Jaguar’s superiority over 3DO’s 32 bit Multiplayer and Sega’s 16 bit Genesis, final unit sales were the inverse.

Console

Processor Design

Price

Unit Sales (millions)

Sega Genesis

16 bit

$149

40

3DO Multiplayer

32 bit

$699

2

Atari Jaguar

64 bit

$249

0.25

In the end, the actors who played Atari sales reps in the commercial were not the only ones who were left with confused looks on their faces.

For more on the failure of Atari, see Innovation and Marketing in the Video Game Industry: Avoiding the Performance Trap, pages 15 & 52.

“We got stuck with the reputation that we were the brand parents wanted their kids to have, which is the kiss of death.” - Nintendo marketing director George Harrison (1994)

In a previous post titled, Too Much of a Good Thing: Explaining the decline of Guitar Hero and Rock Band, I wrote about how the “Guitar Hero Bubble” would inevitably result in a decline in instrument simulation games. Some readers took exception to this comment.

Nintendo fell into the same trap in the early 1990s when it began to release new Mario titles at an unsustainable pace. The resulting crash almost killed the Mario brand.

Given the continued strength of the Mario brand, some readers found it hard to believe that at one time gamers rejected Nintendo’s famous plumber. In response to one such reader, I wrote,

The Mario “bubble” is discussed in Chapter 2 of the book, titled “Nintendo’s Dark Age.” Basically it refers to the rapid expansion of the brand in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a time when Nintendo enjoyed a near monopoly in console gaming worldwide. Nintendo then made a number of serious errors that saw its market share drop off sharply against competitors, namely Sega and later Sony.

One mistake occurred when Nintendo saturated the market will ill-conceived Mario games that gave Nintendo the reputation of being an educational company that offered games for small children. By this time, the demographic had matured and Sega was able to capitalize on it with Sonic the Hedgehog.

George Harrison, Nintendo’s marketing director at the time, recognized the problem in 1994 when he said, “We got stuck with the reputation that we were the brand parents wanted their kids to have, which is the kiss of death.”

As late as 1989, Nintendo enjoyed an 80% market share in the US, and its power over retailers warranted an anti-trust investigation by the US Department of Justice.

Then in 1991, when Sega introduced Sonic the Hedgehog, Nintendo began to see its fortunes decline.  That year, US sales of Sega home game consoles were nearly double Nintendo’s sales.

Instead of retrenching with higher quality games that could breathe new life into Nintendo’s powerful franchises, the company took the opposite approach, licensing the Mario brand to third parties and releasing as many spin-off products as it could. They included re-releases of classic games, educational programs for PCs, and tie-in products, such as movies and merchandise. Few of the products released during this period demonstrated the type of innovation that had made Nintendo the leader in game consoles.

Educational Titles Released in 1991-1993

  • Mario is Missing!
  • Mario Teaches Typing
  • Mario’s Time Machine
  • Mario’s Early Years: Preschool Fun
  • Mario’s Early Years! Fun with Letters
  • Mario’s Early Years: Fun with Numbers
  • Super Mario Bros. & Friends: When I Grow Up

By 1993, Nintendo’s market share was down to 45%, compared to Sega’s 55%. Sales revenue fell by an additional 23% that year.

Table: Nintendo Market Share (Select years, excluding handheld consoles)

Year

Console

Market Share

Market Leader

1989

NES

80%

Nintendo

1993

NES, SNES

45%

Sega

1998

N64

32%

Sony

2003

GameCube

16%

Sony

2008

Wii

65%

Nintendo

Nintendo was rightly worried about its declining fortunes as noted by Nintendo Director Hiroshi Imanishi,

This is not competition for market share. This is mutual bashing that will ruin the whole market. [The Daily Yomiuri, December 21, 1994]

Although competition did not ruin the market, it proved to be a stressful time for Nintendo. It also opened the window to new competitors, chief among them Sony, which went on to lead Nintendo by a margin of 10 to 1 in unit sales by the end of the decade, despite a massive increase in advertising spending by Nintendo.

Mario Bros. as a brand was in decline compared to Sonic the Hedgehog and other new intellectual property. However, Nintendo did not give up on Mario. In 1996, the company released Super Mario 64, which saw a return to the tried and true Mario formula, only this time in 3-D. Andrew Pollack of the New York Times wrote,

Sales are being buoyed by just one game, Super Mario 64, which perhaps exemplifies what Mr. Yamauchi means by creating new experiences. Super Mario 64 is drawing rave reviews for its ability to let the mustachioed plumber with the red cap run in three dimensions, into and out of the screen as well as across it. Some American game magazines say it is the best video game ever. [The New York Times, August 26, 1996]

Nintendo’s comeback was short-lived however. Prior to the launch of the Wii in 2006, Nintendo’s market share had declined to the point that some questioned whether the company would continue to compete in the hardware market or follow Sega’s example and focus exclusively on software (In 2001, Sega exited the hardware business after giving up most of its market share to Sony).

In 1996, Nintendo sales were buoyed by just one game, Super Mario 64

Admittedly, the collapse of the “Mario Bubble” was not the only contributor to Nintendo’s decline. However, it is an example of how brand equity can quickly erode when product quality suffers and too many games are released over a short period of time.

For a complete discussion of Nintendo’s declining years, see Innovation and Marketing in the Video Game Industry: Avoiding the Performance Trap, pages 29-46.

Recently, Gamasutra posted revenue figures for the three major console makers, showing across the board declines. Especially hard hit in 2009 was Sony Corp. with a $1.3 billion drop.

Source: Gamasutra

The analysis rightly points to the decline of the PS2 as one of the reasons behind Sony’s apparent misfortune, a trend we recognized in the book. Part of the problem stems from recent price drops for both the Wii and the entry level Xbox 360 Arcade. For a period in late 2009, Amazon and Walmart were offering $100 entry level Xbox 360 systems. That puts the console in the same price range as the nearly decade old PS2. The current market for PS2 systems is late adopters. They are not only more price conscious, but also more likely to be classified as casual gamers. That makes late adopters a particularly attractive market for Nintendo with its Wii console. Although the Wii is still twice the price of the PS2, it is priced low enough to be a competitor in the entry-level casual gaming market.

Price drops are certainly a big part of the 2009 declines. With lower prices, revenues can decline even when unit sales are up.

Another concern is the software market. As more discounted current generation titles become available, such as Sony’s $20 “Greatest Hits” series, revenue per unit will decline.

Finally, we have the decline of lucrative franchises, such as Guitar Hero and Rock Band, which I have discussed in depth in earlier articles. Taken together, this has created a perfect storm for the industry, a storm that is probably not yet over.

What does 2010 hold?

Promising new technologies like Project Natal will breathe some new life into the industry. At the same time, the decline of the PS2 appears to be unstoppable and Sony is without an entry level replacement.

Sales of the Wii are unsustainable at the high levels experienced in recent years. However, a further price drop could see the Wii replace the PS2 as the entry level console of choice.

Finally, music simulation games are set to experience further declines.

On a positive note, a significant decline in hardware manufacturing costs means that despite declining revenue, 2010 could be the most profitable year yet for the Xbox 360 and PlayStation 3 consoles. And higher console profitability should help offset declines in other areas. The same cannot be said for Nintendo, which has little room for cost improvements in the manufacture of its Wii and DS consoles.

Most technology products focus on product features. Nintendo commercials took a different approach by focusing on users.

In one television spot, titled “Wii for all,” two Japanese Nintendo representatives dressed in black suits arrived at American homes. After bowing to their hosts, they announced, “Wii would like to play” (Innovation and Marketing in the Video Game Industry: Avoiding the Performance Trap, p. 150).

The above video created by Bill Stone of Leo Burnett was part of an award winning campaign by Nintendo, it’s PR partner GolinHarris of Los Angeles, and Leo Burnett, Chicago. In announcing the award for Campaign of the Year (2008), PR Week stated,

The decision by GolinHarris and Nintendo of America to create a new psychographic for its gaming system – a game for non-gamers – coupled with the multitude of mediums pursued to reach critical mass, makes this a textbook case for any launch campaign. That the PR element was integral to massive sales and the sowing of a new audience for Nintendo makes this an obvious selection for PRWeek’s Campaign of the Year.

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