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Media Molecule’s LittleBigPlanet was released in the fall of 2008 as the first title in Sony’s “Play, Create, Share” Initiative, an initiative that places creative control in the hands of users. According to Shuhei Yoshida, Sony senior vice president of product development, LittleBigPlanet was Sony’s best-selling title in 2009, with more than three million copies sold, a fact that not only underscores the increasing level of diversity and innovation in the video game industry, but also the receptiveness of gamers to new ideas.

In the above video, LBP Creator Tony Cliff discusses how users create their own content on LittleBigPlanet

According to Yoshida, it was the success of LittleBigPlanet that led to other projects in the initiative, including the soon to be released racing game, ModNation Racers.

“We are very excited about the creation and sharing side of LittleBigPlanet,” he told Game Informer’s Matt Helgeson. So much so, that Sony is planning more titles in the series.

Clearly, we want to continue to tackle this area of games in many different ways. ModNation Racers came about because the developer, United Front Games, was at [the] Game Developer’s Conference when we demonstrated LittleBigPlanet. They were impressed by the presentation and wanted to do something like that.

Their background and expertise was in the racing genre, so the idea came about to adapt Play, Create, Share to the racing genre.  To me, that was the ideal way of a project happening. Instead of us corporate guys saying, “This is what you have to do. Put the Play, Create, Share aspect in your game.” Those kinds of things are happening with games that haven’t been announced yet, but you will see [them] in the near future.

ModNation Racers allows users to create their own characters, cars, tracks, and more and then share them online with other users.

In the book, we refer to this phenomenon as “customer co-creation of value.” Outside of gaming, customer co-creation of value can be seen in products like YouTube, Wikipedia, and Facebook. And it is a phenomenon that will only continue to grow as more game developers and content providers put users in the driver’s seat.

For more on LittleBigPlanet and customer co-creation of value, see Innovation and Marketing in the Video Game Industry: Avoiding the Performance Trap, pp. 187-190.

References:
Helgeson, M., Sony’s Head of Worldwide Studios Touts a Creative Approach to Game Development, Game Informer, Vol. 203, p. 39

Back in October, I wrote about the decline of music simulation games in a post titled, Too Much of a Good Thing: Explaining the decline of Guitar Hero and Rock Band. That article generated significant discussion on Wired.com and numerous other websites. One article by Joe Rybicki of Plastic Axe focused on this observation from my original posting:

Some companies are trying to compensate by adding more peripherals and more sophisticated game play. That is a common mistake. The target market of these types of games wants simplicity and adding more features will actually have a negative effect on sales.

“Can this be right?” asked Rybicki. “Would players actually like Guitar Hero 5 more if it didn’t include the new Party Play features and competitive multiplayer modes?

The answer is yes and no. Complexity does not need to be a barrier, as long as the complexity is invisible to new users. If the game does not become more difficult to pick up, then additional complexity can be used to
your advantage through unlockable levels designed for more skilled players. Casual gamers would still have access to simplified controls and gameplay.

The entire concept of music games was to make music accessible to non-musicians, people who had neither the time nor patience to learn to play a real instrument. Real guitar players will tell you that Guitar Hero is nothing like playing the guitar, yet numerous rock stars have enjoyed playing the game in its own right, recognizing that it is a form of entertainment and nothing more. I used to know several Air Force pilots who enjoyed playing combat flying games on a regular basis. None had the illusion that the game provided them with actual training. Instead, it was an escape from their regular drills.

Some product developers seem to have forgotten the purpose of games when they create needlessly complex peripherals that attempt to provide more detailed and realistic experiences. These products are not only barriers to new players who feel intimidated by the control scheme, but also to skilled players who want to escape and have fun. We provide several examples in our forthcoming book, such as the NES “game” Miracle Piano Teaching System by Software Toolworks, a piano simulator aimed at helping “players” learn to play a real piano.

One new product that was announced at CES 2010 epitomizes the classic trap that some developers and engineers fall into. It is the Z-1 Hybrid Guitar by San Diego-based Gambridge. The $200 guitar controller for Guitar Hero and Rock Band has dozens of color coded buttons designed to simulate real guitar notes.

Gambridge Guitar Hero / Rock Band Controllers

GamBridge Z-1 and Baby Z guitars at CES 2010

Like the Miracle Piano, the Z-1 is intended to “[bridge] the gap between real guitars and plastic ones.”

The problem is that when the controllers become overly complex, they become obstacles, not only to new players, but also to experienced players who play for “fun” rather than “realism.” Meanwhile, those who are motivated to learn to play a real guitar will likely do so the traditional way. Miracle Piano was never successful because it required the same learning curve as a traditional piano, but at the same time, it lacked the feel and sound of a real piano or even a quality digital keyboard. Kids who hated piano lessons hated Miracle Piano, and were dismayed by their parents’ efforts to turn their beloved game console into an educational tool. In fact, games like Miracle Piano helped kill Nintendo’s once unassailable monopoly.“We got stuck with the reputation that we were the brand parents wanted their kids to have, which is the kiss of death,” said Nintendo’s George Harrison in 1994.

In reviewing the Z-1, Technologizer contributor Jared Newman made this insightful observation.

The ability to use these guitars as instruments in Garage Band sweetens the deal if you’re an actual musician, but if I was looking to teach a Guitar Hero enthusiast how to play, I’d probably opt for a cheap starter electric guitar instead.

Of course, a “real” musician has plenty of advanced midi guitars to choose from and can even turn a regular guitar into a midi controller with the proper adaptors and interface. When I initially discussed the Gambridge guitar on Gamasutra, company founder Stan Gafner assured me that the Z-1 and Baby Z were in fact “real” guitars “developed from work done on patented fingerboard technologies used in producing high-end professional MIDI guitars used by some top studio and stage performers around the world.”

The technologies Gafner was referring to were developed by Starr Labs, a company that makes midi guitars for professional guitarists with prices from $2,000 and up. In fact, Gambridge could conceivably produce a product that is far beyond anything currently available for instrument simulation games. The problem becomes one of  marketability. One of the recurring themes in the book is that complex controllers, menus, and rules create barriers between consumers and products. There have been many great products that should have succeeded, but found limited market acceptance because easier-to-use alternatives were available.

The Z-1 may find a niche as a lower end midi controller, but even success in that market is far from assured. In the early 1990s, Nintendo spent nearly $6 million promoting Miracle Piano, which was intended to bridge the gap between real pianos and games. The system came with a keyboard and software for a bundled cost of $500. It was also highly reviewed and won several awards. Yet, actual sales were less than a fraction of projections.

In short, the Z-1’s needless complexity will not appeal to casual gamers, while professional musicians and advanced amateurs will likely continue to use dedicated instruments.

Gamasutra’s Simon Carless today reported on OnLive’s iPhone ambitions. He writes,

As a final party trick, [OnLive President and CEO Steve Perlman] showed Crytek’s notoriously-demanding Crysis running on an iPhone version of the client. Like other OnLive games, it was actually a full high-definition version of the game running on the cloud, but resized to fit the iPhone’s screen resolution.

Crysis: Coming soon to an iPhone near you

OnLive is a video game service that was originally announced in 2009 as a way for gamers to experience high-end gaming on almost any Internet-equipped device. OnLive takes the heavy computing requirements of modern games and shifts them to remote servers. It then delivers the video feed in real time, allowing gamers to participate in games like Crysis on older computers, Internet appliances, and smartphones.

OnLive iPhone Demonstration: Will iPhone users want to play Crysis?

As we argue in a recent article titled, The Economic Challenges (and opportunities) of Developing Games for the iPhone and iPad, the iPhone can easily become a trap for game developers. OnLive’s Steve Perlman thinks he has a solution. According to Carless, “Perlman believes that, even though lower-footprint Flash and iPhone games are much closer to being delivered instantaneously than their larger-scale cousins, their monetization model is much worse.” Yet Perlman anticipates that gamers will be clamoring to take advantage of an iPhone client that allows them to play more sophisticated titles like Crysis.

The question is, do iPhone users want to play advanced games on their phones? Currently, most smartphone users are satisfied with the various low demand casual games that are already in plentiful supply. Most do not even know what Crysis is. Those who do will likely find the experience to be less than satisfactory compared to high end PC and console gaming. Network lag, small screens, and a less than adequate interface will limit playability on smartphones. Although OnLive may enjoy some success as a smartphone client, that market will remain limited for the foreseeable future.

In the long run,  OnLive could revolutionize the way games are played and consumed. Eventually, cloud gaming will be deployed on a large scale and we will probably someday see TVs designed with OnLive-type integrated gaming capabilities. Until that happens, I see OnLive’s market as hotels, airports, and other public venues where deployment of expensive gaming consoles is impractical.

Nintendo’s ability to expand the market for video games by reaching out to non-gamers with the Wii is well documented. However, even before the Wii was launched, Nintendo sought to break the mold of what it meant to be a gamer. In the early 1980s the company launched is Famicom (NES) console in Japan with features that would allow it to do more than just play games. For example, a modem enabled it to be used for accessing news, weather, and sports, or it could be used for online banking and stock trading. In the early 1990s, Nintendo marketed the Game Boy to adult professionals with games like Tetris.

Nintendo DS Lite bundle featuring "brand ambassador" Olivia Newton-John: "A sharp mind is as important as a healthy body."

Similarly, with the DS, Nintendo has sought to expand the market with games like Brain Age, Brain Training, and Nintendogs. In the following commercial spot, Nintendo “brand ambassador” Olivia Newton-John discusses how Brain Training helps keep her mind sharp.

One common feature in Nintendo commercials for both the Wii and DS is the lack of gameplay footage. In the above video, for example, the game is shown for a total of three seconds. The remainder of the commercial focuses on the actors. The idea is to get potential customers to identify with the player, not the game.

This approach is very similar to the one that Unilever took with its Dove brand beauty soap (see “Hips Feel Good” – Dove’s Campaign for Real Beauty). In 2004, Unilever re-launched Dove by taking the focus away from the soap’s technical merits (such as real cream moisturizers). The Campaign for Real Beauty instead appealed to human emotion, values, and morals in a form of “societal marketing” that focused more on the consumer and consumer needs. Commercials that once centered on the soap, instead focused on “real” women.

Prior to 2004, Dove commercials focused on the soap

True Colors – Dove’s soap-free 2006 Super Bowl commercial demonstrated the power of societal marketing

Societal marketing has become an increasingly important and profitable marketing strategy for companies. Often it focuses on environmental issues, such as reducing greenhouse gases (e.g., hybrid cars, solar power, recycling), but it can also focus on promoting healthy behavior (e.g., diet and exercise), while discouraging unhealthy behavior (e.g., drug abuse and smoking).
Traditionally, and often unjustly, video games have been associated with unhealthy outcomes like violence and obesity. In much the same way as Dove’s Campaign for Real Beauty helped consumers rethink the definition of beauty, games like Brain Age and Wii Fit are getting people to reevaluate the role of video games in society.

Still, Nintendo’s market expansion efforts have not always worked according to plan. In North America, for example, it took much longer than in Europe and Japan to convince consumers that the DS was more than an expensive child’s toy. Whereas European sales were driven by adult-oriented games like Brain Age, North America continued to be dominated by children’s games like Pokemon.

Today, other companies are following Nintendo’s lead by making games and gaming console’s that fill the needs of adult non-gamers. The most successful of these will have differentiating features that are attuned to shifting societal values and that appeal to fundamental emotional needs.

A few months ago, I posted an article titled, Too Much of a Good Thing: Explaining the Decline of Guitar Hero and Rock Band which stimulated discussion on various blogs that linked to the article. Some of the issues raised related to complexity, usability, product life cycle issues, etc. But a comment on Plastic Axe was about something completely different:

Right now you can walk into any given Best Buy and there are probably at least three aisles worth of peripheral packages. This week they’re adding DJ Hero and next week will see the Band Hero set. This has to be overwhelming for the common consumer. Now most of those aren’t adding ‘new’ peripherals to the mix, but I’d imagine what is essentially the same thing in 10 different styles can be just as confusing and detrimental. At some point the regular shopper is going to think “Enough already!”.

When product choice becomes overwhelming to customers, they become subject to the “paradox of choice.” In the book, we discuss the phenomenon as it relates to game consoles, but it applies equally to peripherals, software, and other products.

Research has shown that even when faced with two choices, customers are often less willing to buy a product than if they only have one product available to them. Common wisdom holds that consumers are better off when they have more product choices to cater to their individual tastes and needs.

In reality, offering more choices could cause you to lose customers, resulting in declining sales for each product offered, and possibly for the product category as a whole.

When Scarcity Drives Demand

The flip-side to the paradox of choice is “scarcity marketing.” Marketers are familiar with the concept of creating scarcity as a way of driving sales. In the late 1990s, I had a discussion with a marketing agency that was responsible for the launch of a major game console.

To create buzz, they advertised to a select audience that the console would be for sale one day earlier than the rest of the world, but only in one store in a small rural town. That morning, the agency sent a film crew to the store to document the long line that had formed to get the console a day early.

In 2007 and 2008, an ongoing shortage of Wii consoles caused people to line up for hours. Others paid as much as $600 on the gray market (more than double the suggested retail price). Some accused Nintendo of deliberately causing the scarcity to create demand.

Very early the next morning, they broadcast the film via satellite to major news studios that then rebroadcast the footage on morning news programs. That sent customers scrambling to the nearest store before the consoles sold out. People did not realize that the footage was from the day before and the news studios were too understaffed to verify the accuracy of the footage (that it was not taken the same day).

Personally, I felt the agency had acted unethically and I was surprised by how willing they were to boast of their “success.” Nevertheless, the agency understood that a perception of scarcity can create demand, just as too much choice can suppress it.

This is a revised version of a post that originally appeared on Gamasutra on November 3, 2009

The 2009 Holiday Issue of PC Gamer magazine features an article by indie developer and Tripwire President John Gibson entitled “From Rags to Retail.” Gibson recounts the many trials associated with starting a new game development studio.  “We had sacrificed every second of spare time for almost two years” to create Red Orchestra, recalled Gibson.

Some of us even left our jobs to work on the mod full-time with hopes of winning the [Epic/Nvidia Make Something Unreal] contest. For the final four months before submitting the mod, I’d…code for 18 hours [a day]. My wife brought me food at the computer so I wouldn’t have to stop programming.

File:Red Orchestra box art.jpg
After winning the contest, Gibson thought he had it made. Distributors would come knocking at the door to offer lucrative contracts. It was Gibson’s “biggest mistake.” Nobody wanted to distribute Red Orchestra.

After numerous rejections, Gibson and his team were about to give up. Then they decided to try online distribution through the then newly launched Steam download service. “What did we have to lose?” he asked. The decision was fortuitous, as Red Orchestra was one of the first exclusive third party titles to appear on the popular online gaming service. “Our three-year-long dream was finally released.”

Gibson cites a number a factors in the success of Red Orchestra, such as timing, talent, and “a little luck.”

In fact, successfully distributing independent media products requires a lot more than luck. I recently published a case study about an independent film studio called Yves Productions.

The case synopsis reads:

After years of hard work and an investment of nearly $1 million, Yves could not find anyone to distribute his film. At the time of the case, it was difficult to get distribution because there were more films on the market than ever before. Historically, it took more effort to make an independent film, and distribution was easier to secure. When the digital revolution began, the market was flooded with more independent films than distributors could handle. By 2001, independent films were a commodity and DVD distribution deals were plentiful, but theatrical distribution was almost impossible to get because there were more independent films than screens to put them on.

Alex Yves encountered many of the same roadblocks as Gibson. Like Gibson, he thought he had it made with strong Hollywood connections, a well-known international cast, an experienced director, and a considerable investment to make the film as professional as possible. Yet, distributors would not release the film unless he relinquished nearly all the rights (and potential profits). The film remains unreleased to this day.

During case research interviews, Yves admitted that one of his biggest mistakes was not securing distributor support prior to sinking considerable sums of time and money into his film studio.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/c/c1/LittleBigPlanetOfficialUKBoxArt.png/250px-LittleBigPlanetOfficialUKBoxArt.pngThe case has several parallels in the video game industry. The problem in both film and video games is that the sheer quantity of product on the market increases the risks for distributors that need to incur marketing and promotion expenses. In much the same way as the advent of new technologies like cheap HD camcorders allowed anyone to become a film producer, new easy-to-use development tools are transforming the video game industry.

One of the lessons Yves discovered was that no matter how good your product is, it is important to secure contracts early in the process. Media Molecule, for example, secured funding from Sony long before Little Big Planet was even in the early alpha development stage.  Media Molecule founder Mark Healey went to Sony, even though he was sure they were going to think “we were a bunch of mad men,” given how unusual the Little Big Planet concept was, and the fact that 2-D platformers had fallen out of favor.

The Sony partnership proved critical to Little Big Planet’s success. Not only did it provide the funding needed to ensure a quality product, it opened promotional opportunities that would be unavailable to indie developers who are without deep pocketed sponsors.

What lessons do these cases demonstrate?

  • Develop a comprehensive marketing and distribution plan before you become too involved in your project.
  • If possible, try to secure funding and distribution contracts before you get too far into development. Even if the terms seem like most of the benefits accrue to the distributor, in a saturated market, going alone will prove exceedingly difficult.
  • Don’t assume that because you have a great product that distributors will come knocking on your door. Yves Productions had film stars and an established director. Gibson won the Epic/Nvidia contest. Yet, both had a hard time finding someone to promote their products.
  • Don’t assume that you need a working beta to pitch your idea. Media Molecule only had a concept when they went to Sony for funding.
  • Be willing to take risks and try new things. Red Orchestra’s success is directly traceable to the fact that it was one of the first third party exclusives available on Steam.

Of course, even if you follow all of these lessons, success is far from guaranteed. As Gibson points out, the path to success is long and hard. However, large distributors, such as Sony, Microsoft, and Steam are realizing that most of the important innovations in the video game industry are coming from independent developers. Large game studios simply can’t afford to take the types of risks needed to bring products like Little Big Planet to market. That niche will always belong to indie studios.

This article was originally posted on Gamasutra on November 18, 2009. It includes additional commentary and replies by John Gibson and other developers.

In 2007, after Nintendo suddenly and unexpectedly reestablished its leadership position in the home console market, Sony and Microsoft were left wondering what to do. Clayton Christensen, who became famous for his thesis on disruptive innovation in the hard drive sector, offered several possible responses.

  1. Copy Nintendo by developing a motion controller.
  2. Repurpose a legacy product to compete with the Wii.
  3. Disrupt the disruptor

The Wii Remote, which cost less than $10 to make, was a game changer for Nintendo.

Although the article was directed at Sony, it could be applied equally well to Microsoft.

In making his first suggestion, Christensen appears to be unaware that Sony launched its PS3 system with a motion sensing controller – the Sixaxis. However, he rightly anticipated the challenges of a “me-too” approach.

While this would be the quickest path to market, it has some real risks. Nintendo’s system has been optimized around its controller. Simply sticking a motion-based controller onto an existing system could result in a highly disappointing product. The controller would remain an afterthought, as opposed to an integral part of the product.

In fact, that was how many gamers viewed Sixaxis – as an afterthought. What made matters worse was the lack of rumble, a deficit that was later remedied with the introduction of the Dual Shock 3.

Christensen recommends the third option as the preferred response to Nintendo.

Instead of following a me-too strategy, Sony could seek to truly develop a category-changing project. While this approach would take more time and require greater investment, it has the most long-term potential—if Sony can figure out a different measure of performance on which to compete in the video game market.

The question is how to identify category changing projects that offer different measures of performance. Christensen does not answer this question, nor does he explain why innovations introduced by Sony and Microsoft, such as Blu-ray and Xbox Live, do not qualify as category changing.

Sony saw its “different measure of performance” in the combination of the Cell processor and Blu-ray drive, two technologies that Sony believed set it apart from competitors. The problem was that few developers were able exploit the unique characteristics of the Cell and few customers cared about Blu-ray (at least initially). Still, any Sony executives who may have read Christensen’s advice must have been left wondering why he did not see the PS3’s unique features as category changing.

Microsoft’s own category changing features were centered around Xbox Live – by far the leading online gaming community in the world. Today, Xbox Live has become the de facto standard for online gaming and it is Microsoft, not Nintendo, that continues to lead the industry in this increasingly important niche. Meanwhile, Nintendo’s online service has become its Achilles heel, as it struggles to keep up with the competition.

Project Natal could be another category changing innovation when it is introduced later this year. Although Natal can be used as a motion sensing gaming interface like the Wii Remote, it offers much more in terms of artificial intelligence,  interface design, and potential non-gaming uses. For example, Natal-type technologies will one day provide hands-free control of products ranging from automobiles to security systems. In the long run, that will prove far more disruptive than the Wii Remote.

In the futuristic film Minority Report, Natal-type interfaces are used for everything from interactive billboards (above) to security systems.

In a recent Gamasutra post titled, Creating industry ecosystems: How indie developers contribute to large firm success, I explained why large companies need to work with talented independent developers to infuse the video game industry with new ideas.

In recent years there has been a transformation in the way people think about games. As development costs skyrocket and video game companies compete for the same customers, more studios are finding success in markets that traditionally have not been well served by the industry.

Games like flOw are helping to bring fresh ideas to the industry.

The problem becomes one of how to reach new customers with new ideas without betting the farm on concepts that may not work. For some companies, the answer has been to enter into partnerships with independent studios.

Independent studios, like independent filmmakers, are typically more innovative than large studios. What they lack is the funds to bring grand ideas to fruition. Large publishers and studios need to enter into partnerships with independent studios as a way to build relationships with some of the brightest minds in the industry.

This use of open innovation recognizes that large companies can no longer conceive, design, develop and market new products and services all on their own. No firm has all the knowledge capabilities, money or time needed in today´s costly environment. Firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, to advance their technology.

In Innovation and Marketing in the Video Game Industry: Avoiding the Performance Trap, we discuss how companies like Sony are partnering with independent studios to create games the push the limits of technology and innovation.

Last week, Gamasutra posted an interview with two game developers who have benefited from this new model, Kellee Santiago and Robin Hunicke of TGC. Santiago noted that “there are some movements in publishers – but especially in independent or VC-funded studios – towards a more project-oriented funding structure like you see in film.”

Instead of the software company model where you would buy a piece of the company and maybe rights to the IP, there is some motion away from that, and at the start it will depend on whether those initial projects are successful or not.  So I’m really hoping that those investments go well and we do move towards that model, as it does permit a lot more creative freedom in a company.

In fact, it is the lack of “creative freedom” that programmers at large studios often complain about. Tim Ryan wrote about his frustration as a game developer in Lead Designers Who Only Say ‘No’.

I’ve literally had a boss say to me. ‘Sorry, you can’t do that. It’s not what Halo would do.’ In fact, ‘What would Halo do?’ was his motto. In this case, he’s not defying tradition as in the previous example, he’s just not thinking beyond his competition.

In a comment at the end of the article, Ryan adds,

There’s safety in doing what’s been done. There’s less risk for a designer who says “No” to the new and “Yes” to the tried and true. I think the same is true all the way up to green-light committees. They pay lip-service to developing original IP, but in the end just chase whatever hits currently dominate the charts.

That makes sense given the amount of investment at risk. Large publishers cannot afford to risk big budget titles on unproven concepts. Instead, partnerships are helping to fill the void and ensuring that great ideas continue to reshape the industry. In TGC’s case, Sony wanted to “experiment” with new models, like digital distribution. “TGC games have that sort of fresh and intimate feeling,” explained Robin Hunicke, who joined TGC later in the project.

They’re really handcrafted – you can’t help but love them when you play them. That’s something that I think any developer notices immediately. It was clear to me that they are extremely concerned about the player experience – and that’s not something that’s just lip-service; it’s something that they think about every day.

"There's safety in doing what's been done." Big budget titles like Final Fantasy XIII cannot afford to experiment with unproven concepts.

Although large companies may not have the luxury to think about “fresh” experiences when tens of millions of dollars are at stake, they can continue to drive innovation through partnerships with small studios that are less afraid to experiment with new ideas.

The Wii: Nintendo’s Video Game Revolution by David Wesley and Gloria Barczak was recently recognized as one of the top business cases in 2009 by Ivey Publishing. The case is written from the viewpoint of George Harrison, Senior Vice President of Marketing for Nintendo of America, who is faced with severe product shortages after Wii sales unexpectedly surge worldwide. In preparing his company’s marketing strategy for the 2007 holiday season, he must develop a product positioning strategy that takes into consideration continuing shortages.

In 2007 and 2008, line ups like this one were common as Nintendo tried to manage ongoing product shortages

The case discusses Nintendo’s competitive position prior to the launch of the Wii, the success of the 2004 DS handheld console launch, and the factors that contributed to the ultimate success of the Wii, such as brand loyalty, content availability, third-party support and adherence to industry standards. The case also considers how radical innovations can be used to win market share from technically superior products focused on incremental innovations.

The Wii: Nintendo’s Video Game Revolution was a winning entry at the 2008 John Molson MBA Case Writing Competition in Montreal, Canada, and is featured in Understanding Business Strategy: Concepts and Cases by R. Duane Ireland, Robert E. Hoskisson, and Michael A. Hitt. In addition, a  Japanese version, translated under the supervision of Prof. Takuro Yoda of Keio Business School, is available from Ivey Publishing and its worldwide partners.

About Ivey Publishing

Ivey Publishing is the world’s second largest publisher of business case studies and the largest producer of Asian cases in the world, with over 6,000 products in its collection. Academic instructors can obtain free unlimited access to the complete case collection by registering with Ivey Publishing  at:

Web Site:
www.iveycases.com

Email:
cases@ivey.uwo.ca

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(519) 661-3882

Telephone:
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1-800-649-6355
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When Sony launched the PlayStation 3 in 2006, the company touted its IBM Cell processor as one of the key features that distinguished the PS3 from other consoles. This “supercomputer on a chip,” would allow developers “for the first time can create games closer to actual intelligence instead of artificial intelligence,” Sony claimed. Although game developers are only now beginning to take advantage of the PS3’s processing ability, the United States Air Force has taken the claim literally.

When complete, the PlayStation 3 supercomputer project will cost $2 million.

Today, Stars and Stripes newspaper announced a $2 million government project to create a research supercomputer using 2,000 PS3s. The project will be headed by the Air Force Research Laboratory in Rome, New York.

According to Stars and Stripes,

Key to the whole idea is the console’s cell processor, which was designed to easily work in concert with other cell processors to combine processing power and has been critically acclaimed for its number crunching ability.

This lets the researchers leverage power toward running such applications as Back Projection Synthetic Aperture Radar Imager formation, high definition video image processing, and Neuromorphic Computing, which mimics human nervous systems.

Richard Linderman, a senior research scientist at the Air Force laboratory, explained that “this will be far and away the largest interactive high-performance computer.” Linderman also noted that the project uses Linux, an operating system that Sony has supported on the PS3 since day one.

Low cost supercomputer projects that use off-the-shelf components are not new. In 2003, I worked closely with Compaq Computer Corporation to create a case study series titled, “Compaq High Performance Computing.” By using standard components, Compaq’s supercomputer line, known as the Alpha Server SC, attempted to avoid some of the risk associated with supercomputer development.

One of the advantages the Alpha Server SC team was its ownership of the DEC Alpha microprocessor. Alpha, which was manufactured by Mitsubishi of Japan, was first developed in 1993. At the time, it was world’s best performing microprocessor for scientific applications, and became the core of DEC’s next generation servers.

A decade later, Alpha still outperformed most microprocessors on the market, including Intel’s Itanium. Launched in 2001, after seven years of development and $2 billion in R&D expenditures, Intel’s Itanium was a 64-bit processor capable of running at 800 MHz. It was also described as a “massively complex and [expensive] CPU which didn’t give the expected stellar performance.”

The architectural innovation that Compaq brought was scalable machines made by connecting commodity components.  This approach reduced the development risk and moved Compaq away from the “one mistake and you die” model that characterized prior generations of supercomputers.  The Air Force project is another example of how scalable designs are substituting for proprietary designs in the market, although purpose-designed supercomputers are still needed for specific applications.

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